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Social robotics is a quickly evolving and expanding field in which significant
contributions may be made by the communication discipline. Prior research has
demonstrated the successful employment of robots throughout varying contexts such as
work team decision-making, education, and healthcare. The purpose of this study is to
expand upon existing research and generate an understanding of how robots may be used
in competitive communication environments. The study highlights face negotiation
theory (FNT) and the computers are social actors (CASA) paradigm to frame predictions
and understanding of how humans interact with robots in a negotiation context. The
researcher uses a 2 x 2 experimental method to examine how variables of guilt persuasion
and robot agency influence human concession in a human-robot negotiation game.
Statistical analysis of overall participant concession during negotiation indicates that
there is no significant difference in how humans negotiate with a robot based on the
robot’s enactment of guilt appeals or whether the robot is positioned as a principal or
agent negotiator. Further research is suggested to examine to what extent face might play
a role in human-robot interaction, both in cooperative and competitive contexts.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Most people familiar with negotiation can relate to the classic car sale scenario.
You are sitting at a desk across from the well-dressed salesperson as she presents the
details of your new car purchase. Her goal – to sell you the four-wheel drive, limited
edition behemoth with leather packaging, navigation, seating for 13, and an exclusive,
chrome-dragon hood ornament. Your goal – to buy something practical to haul you and
your dog around the city and at a price that does not instill near immediate buyer’s
remorse or eventual bankruptcy. After much haggling over ticket price, financing options,
and included maintenance, an agreement is reached, and hopefully, you and the
saleswoman both go home feeling satisfied.
Negotiating, whether for a new car, whose turn it is to do the dishes, or the details
of a multi-billion dollar acquisition, can be a tricky and sometimes daunting prospect,
especially for those of us with little skill or experience in such scenarios. No negotiation
is the same. Not only do the faces change, but also do the expectations, attitudes, values,
and desires brought to the table by each person. However, there is the catch – person
implies human communication. The future of negotiation may further evolve as we are
pitted against negotiators made not of flesh, blood, and emotions, but ones instead
comprised of plastic, metal, circuits, and mathematical logic. We may soon realize the
employment of robots as negotiation adversaries.
As far-fetched as negotiating with a robot may seem, technology may not be far
from making this a reality. Already, computers and robots interact as companions
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(Lehman, Iacono, Dautenhaun, Marti, & Robins, 2014) as well as partners and teammates
in decision-making processes and the completion of other complex tasks (Kaupp,
Makarenko, & Durrant-Whyte, 2010). Just as these entities may work with us, they may
too work against us. Of course, this is not meant to inspire thoughts of judgment day and
the eventual enslavement of humans by robots. Instead, it is merely acknowledging the
role that more sophisticated technology may play in reducing the level of human
involvement in certain contexts. Using computers and robots to fulfill surrogate human
roles is not a new notion. Many of the robots employed today have very little interaction
with the majority of humans. Others, such as automated phone systems and automated
teller machines (ATM), currently address many of our day-to-day concerns, fulfilling
more of a social interaction and human service function.
The implications for social robots, robots capable of interacting with humans
based upon a set of social rules, span disciplines and have the potential to positively
affect human learning (Robins, Dautenhahn, Boekhurst, & Billard, 2005; Tanaka,
Cicourel, & Movellan, 2007), health (Breazeal, 2011; Scasesellati, 2007), task
management (Breazeal, Kidd, Thomaz, Hoffman, & Berlin, 2005; Goetz, Kiesler, &
Powers, 2003; Hinds, Roberts, & Jones, 2004), and overall social wellbeing (Hutson,
Lim, Bentley, Bianchi-Berthouze, & Bowling, 2011; Kahn, Freier, Friedman, Severson,
& Feldman, 2004). For example, Broekens, Heerink, and Rosendal (2009) highlight
abundant evidence that social robots play a critical role in the care of elderly persons in
Japan. They have been demonstrated to help improve mood, decrease loneliness, and
encourage social connectivity. However, the authors remark that the studies reviewed
tended to have research designs lacking robustness and were largely conducted in Japan,
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a culture at the forefront of humanoid social robot development and incorporation
throughout society. This allows some, but not extensive, application to other cultures that
are relative strangers to these forms of technology. In education, robots have been found
to be useful tools in tutoring Japanese elementary students (Kanda, Hirano, Eaton, &
Ishiguro, 2004) as they helped to establish common ground with students through social
interaction and improved their retention of English. Kanda and Ishiguro (2005)
additionally found evidence that robots not only improve learning of foreign language,
but also demonstrate effectiveness at establishing longitudinal relationships with students.
They argue that further development of social robotics has significant implications for
providing student playmates and highly effective tutors. These few studies alone
demonstrate the possibilities of widespread implementation of robots in a variety of
contexts.
Robots may enact a social component of human interaction, but they are
obviously not human. Robots are not prone to anxiety, jealousy, or hasty generalizations
fueled by anger. Even the most task-oriented sociopath is still human and, as a result, is
susceptible to emotionally driven motives and behaviors. Herein lies the benefit of
moving robots from a strictly assistive function to a more competitive role. Naturally,
conflict is emotionally charged and peaks both positive and negative arousal in people
(Bodtker & Jameson, 2001). Introducing a robot to the interaction as primary negotiator
would serve to reduce the emotional influence that occurs in negotiation. Although a
programmer may have an ego, a robot does not. Rather, a robot functions on specific
directives to achieve a favorable conclusion according to a cost-benefit analysis assigned
by the programmer. However, it may be less about the effectiveness of the robot’s
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reasoning abilities, and more about the effectiveness of the robot in interactions with
humans. How does a human respond to a robot that has been positioned as an opponent?
The concept of robots have existed long enough that they are a part of most peoples’
perceptual sets, but how does the relative novelty and uncertainty of an adversarial robot
affect negotiation processes and outcomes? Although robots may be immune to emotion,
is it possible for a robot to strategically trigger emotional responses such as guilt in a
human? Additionally, to what extent will the effectiveness of guilt appeals differ if
participants feel guilt for the robot or toward another human controlling the robot?
The purpose of this study is to further the discussion of human-robot negotiation
by examining the employment of guilt appeals by a robot and the role of perceived
motive during negotiation. Specifically, this paper will investigate whether a robot can
effectively employ emotional appeals regarding fairness in negotiation, seeking to elicit
feelings of guilt and influence the behavior of a human negotiator. Additionally, this
paper will address how motive assigned to a robot (whether the robot is negotiating on
behalf of itself or on behalf of another human) affects how a human opponent perceives
the robot and how the human responds to offers in a negotiation.
In order to address the research questions posed above, a literature review
follows, examining the relevant research pertaining to Face Negotiation Theory (FNT;
Ting-Toomey, 1988). FNT will be used as a theoretical framework to discuss how
humans respond to one another during negotiation as well as to predict how humans may
respond to a social robot as well. Following a discussion of FNT, this paper will examine
the similarities and differences in Human-Human Interaction (HHI) and Human-Robot
Interaction (HRI). Zhao (2006) and others argue that humans may interact with humanoid
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robots similarly to how they interact with other humans, applying the same social rules
and behaviors. This point is further highlighted by the Computers are Social Actors
(CASA) paradigm (Nass, Steuer, Tauber, & Reeder, 1993), included as a framework for
further comparing HHI and HRI.
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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Conflict and Negotiation: Framing a Human-Robot Scenario
Negotiation is a widely studied topic in a variety of contexts given its application
in nearly every aspect of communication. People use negotiation as a tool to navigate
conflict, defined simply by Deutsch (1973) as the occurrence of incompatible activities.
With such a simple definition of conflict, one may be able to identify a swath of events
that took place just yesterday at work that match this description. Perhaps you and a
colleague needed to use the copier at the same time, you had two meetings scheduled to
occur at the same time, or maybe a team member confronted you with a conflicting,
“better” plan for how best to manage a project on which you were assigned to work
together. Regardless of the reason, in order to resolve the conflict, negotiation in some
form must take place. Bazerman and Neale (1983) define negotiation as a joint decisionmaking process in which the allocation of scarce resources is determined by two or more
parties. Given that the literature on negotiation is vast, the following section will
highlight the literature focusing on Face Negotiation Theory and its implications for how
individuals incorporate varying styles for managing conflict. This is later followed by a
discussion of the relevant literature regarding human-robot communication and
implications for negotiation.
Face Negotiation Theory
Face Negotiation Theory (FNT) claims that face is an explanatory mechanism for
one’s chosen conflict styles (Ting-Toomey, 1988, 2005). Face is the favorable image that
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an individual claims and seeks to protect in social and relational networks through
behaviors known as facework. Important aspects of face include an individual’s desire to
be (a) viewed as competent and likeable by others to maintain interdependence (positive
face) and (b) to be autonomous from others such that they can achieve individual goals
free from interference (negative face; Ting-Toomey et al., 1991). Facework can be used
as a means to protect one’s personal face or to support or attack the face of another party
(Ting-Toomey, 1988, 2005). At its core, FNT posits that communication is an ongoing
process of facework as individuals are in a perpetual state of negotiating self and otherface. Although all humans negotiate face, various cultures engage in facework differently
(Oetzel, et al., 2001; Ting-Toomey, et al., 2000; Trubisky, Ting-Toomey, & Lin, 1991).
The purpose of the current research is to test whether humans feel the need to protect
self-face or the face of others by conceding to guilt appeals enacted by a robot. In other
words, will participants “feel badly” about treating a robot unfairly such that it provokes
a need to engage in facework with the robot and influences how they negotiate?
Ultimately, the manner in which individuals engage facework is dependent upon
one’s self-construal and face concerns (Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003). Self-construal is
defined by Markus and Kitayama (1991) as one’s self-perception of self-image traits,
which can be either independent or interdependent. In other words, whether the
individual places emphasis on his individuality and uniqueness or his connectedness and
relationships will influence how he engages in facework. These two elements of
individual self-construal (independent vs. interdependent) are often associated with their
larger cultural dimensions, individualism and collectivism respectively (Ting-Toomey,
Oetzel, & Yee-Jung, 2001). In conjunction with face concerns, the focus of attention,
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energy, or resources in a conflict is a factor (Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 1998), which can
be self, other, or mutually directed, that influences an individual’s implementation of
certain conflict styles.
Prior research (Zhang, Ting-Toomey, & Oetzel, 2014; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey,
2003) has highlighted the difficulty of operationalizing mutual concern beyond a
theoretical discussion and as such has focused primarily on measuring self and other
concern. As a result, these two dimensions of concern (concern for self, concern for
other) were incorporated in a conflict styles model that assigns five conflict styles
according to variations in one’s concern for self and concern for other (Pruitt &
Carnevale, 1993; Rahim, 1983; Thomas & Kilmann, 1974). The five conflict styles,
integrating, competing, compromising, avoiding, and obliging, are structured in the
model as follows. Understanding these conflict styles is important, as it is often
referenced in conjunction with FNT research (Oetzel, 1998; Oetzel, Meares, Myers, &
Lara, 2003; Ting-Toomey, et al., 1991), and it foregrounds the current study, which seeks
to determine what conflict style behaviors a human is likely to enact in negotiation with a
robot. Integrating is associated with high concern for self and other and is often termed
the “win-win” model as parties seek to provide satisfactory outcomes for themselves and
others. Competing incorporates high concern for self and low concern for other, often
associated with someone willing to impress their demands to achieve an individual goal
with little to no care of the opposition’s outcomes. Compromising is comprised of
moderate concern for self and other, involving concessions on behalf of both parties in
order to reach an agreement and sometimes referred to as “We both win and lose”.
Obliging indicates low concern for self and high concern for others; the individual
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enacting this conflict style typically gives in to the demands of opposition in order to
maintain harmony. Lastly, avoiding is associated with low concern for both self and
other, where the individual seeks to simply withdraw from the conflict. With an
understanding of FNT and the prominent incorporation of conflict styles in the FNT
literature, a more focused understanding of emotions in conflict is needed.
FNT has been a prominent theory in conflict research, but until recently, the role
of emotions in FNT has been largely unaddressed (Zhang, Ting-Toomey, & Oetzel,
2014). Prior research has indicated that emotion plays a role in the resulting conflict
process and behaviors (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997; Bodtker & Jameson,
2001; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2006). Zhang and colleagues (2014) examined
how emotions of anger, compassion, and guilt had an effect on the specific conflict styles
chosen by individuals during conflict. Results indicated that anger was positively
associated with a competing style, compassion was positively related with integrating,
compromising, and obliging styles in both China and the U.S., and guilt was positively
associated with an obliging conflict style for U.S. participants and avoiding for Chinese
participants.
Of particular interest to this study are guilt and its effects in conflict negotiation.
Guilt has been defined as a social phenomenon (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton,
1994) in which the negative evaluation of one’s personal behavior resulting from the
perceived harm inflicted upon a relational partner inspires feelings of remorse and
possible recourse to remedy the harm (Covert, Tangney, Maddux, & Heleno, 2003; Van
Kleef, et al., 2006). Feelings of guilt elicited in negotiation have been associated with
increased empathy and perspective taking (Leith & Baumeister, 1998), as well as
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behaviors of compliance and efforts to either prevent transgressions (Baumeister et al.,
1994) or counter the harmful actions that have already occurred (Covert, et al. 2003). In
this respect, guilt is an effective tool in conflict for seeking appeasement (Van Kleef et
al., 2006). Ketelaar and Au (2003) demonstrated that increased feelings of guilt were
positively associated with one’s willingness to cooperate in human-human negotiation
games. The researchers tested this by having participants play two difference negotiation
games (Ultimatum Game & Prisoner’s Dilemma Game) and experimentally manipulating
the feelings of guilt. Other researchers have determined similar findings (Broekens,
Jonker, & Meyer, 2010; Mandel & Dhami, 2005), as well as asserting that players and
negotiators make decisions based on the objective of avoiding guilt (Battigalli &
Dufwenberg, 2007; Dufwenberg, 2002). What remains unknown is if these feelings of
guilt can manifest in human-robot negotiations and replicate similar results of participant
obliging and conceding as examined in prior research (Zhang et al., 2014).
How Do We Communicate with Computerized Entities?
With the previous discussion of negotiation in mind, the following section
reviews current research regarding how humans interact with computerized entities, any
non-human object that operates as a function of computer programming. The CASA
paradigm (Nass et al., 1993) foregrounds this discussion, demonstrating that humans treat
computers in a similar manner to how they treat other humans, even in situations with
limited social cues. The CASA paradigm is then expanded to incorporate specifically
human-robot interaction, which eventually seeks to draw connections between humanhuman and human-robot negotiation.
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Computers as Social Actors
The CASA paradigm (Nass et al., 1993) suggests that humans will communicate
with computers similarly to how they would communicate with other humans. Further,
one’s tendency to anthropomorphize a computer exists even in the presence of minimal
social cues and despite the user’s explicit awareness and acknowledgement that the
computer is neither human nor deserving of human-like treatment. Nass and colleagues
(1993) term this process as ethopoeia. Since its inception, the simplicity of CASA has
theoretically framed numerous research studies seeking to affirm that humans treat
computers and humans similarly. The process of applying CASA is simple as it involves
identifying a study of interpersonal human-human interaction and replicating the study
with a computer substituting for one of the humans. According to CASA, such research
methods should expect to replicate similar results as well.
Study replications such as these have been conducted many times by Nass and
others. Using CASA as a framework, researchers have determined that individuals
identify and assign human personalities such as dominance and submissiveness to
computers based on their interaction in the classic Desert Survival Scenario (Nass, Moon,
Fogg, Reeves, & Dryer, 1995), and that people make mindless attributions such as gender
(Lee, Nass, & Brave, 2000), ethnicity (Nass, Moon, & Green, 1997), politeness,
reciprocity (Katagiri, Nass, & Takeuchi, 2001; Nass, Moon, & Carney, 1999), and
expertise (Nass & Moon, 2000; Nass, Reeves, & Leshner, 1996) to computers as well.
In an effort to understand why the CASA effect exists, Nass and Moon (2000)
discussed a number of potential reasons, including social cues lending to
anthropomorphic application, overlearning, and mindless attribution. Ultimately, the
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authors argued that the latter was the most likely of reasons, but that there may be
varying degrees to which mindless attribution comes into play based upon the
primitiveness of responses or the frequency of use for a particular social rule (Nass &
Moon, 2000). Additional studies have been conducted to examine the difference between
perceptions elicited by a computer and those elicited by a human. In these studies, all
factors of the scenario are controlled with the exception of a single condition. Participants
are informed that they are either communicating with a human via CMC or
communicating with the computer. For example, Fogg and Nass (1997) examined the
role that flattery played in HCI. Results demonstrated that flattery communicated by a
computer, regardless of its genuineness, produced similar effects as flattery
communicated by another human. Even features such as non-human, computerized
voices were deemed capable of manifesting personalities that encouraged similar
attributions and treatments of computers as demonstrated to humans with similar
personalities (Nass & Lee, 2000; Nass, Moon, Fogg, Reeves, & Dryer, 1995). A
computer’s ability to elicit similar perceptions and behaviors to that of a human
highlights their effectiveness as teammates (Nass, Fogg, & Moon, 1996) and other
potential social applications such as companions (Tung, Sato, Deng, & Lin, 2009).
Despite substantial evidence supporting the CASA paradigm, the question remains as to
whether this theoretical framework applies to HRI as well as it applies to HCI. The
following section seeks to establish this connection.
Communicating with a Social Robot
Whereas CASA supports the notion that people treat computers similarly to how
they would treat other humans, interacting with a social robot presents a communication
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context unique to typical human-computer interaction (HCI) and significantly distinct
from computer-mediated communication (CMC). To highlight this distinction, Zhao
(2006) argues that CMC is the communication between humans through a computer
medium, whereas HRI is the direct human communication with a computer (robot). The
robot is not just a medium for communication; it is the intended receiver of
communication (e.g., I speak through a mobile phone to my intended receiver, another
human, but I speak face-to-face with a robot). The technology and its implications for
communication differ drastically.
Additionally, HCI is more commonly used in reference to interaction with a
computerized interface to optimize use of a larger technical system (Zhao, 2006). For
example, HCI might look at how humans interact with and navigate through a web page.
Ultimately, researchers might determine that because humans naturally categorize
information, it makes sense to build the interface menu into categories for users to click
through and navigate the system. Conversely, HRI incorporates more human-human
communication characteristics that go beyond interacting with an interface. As Zhao
states, “Humanoid social robots are not user-friendly computers that operate as machines;
rather, they are user-friendly computers that operate as humans.” (2006, p. 403). Breazeal
(2001) defines a social robot as an autonomous entity designed specifically to interact
with humans. The addition of “humanoid” implies that these robots interact in a humanlike manner, adhering to social rules and expectations. As many researchers would then
argue, it is important that HRI studies be classified distinctly from HCI as the capabilities
and implications of each field differ significantly.
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This distinction does not, however, indicate that the CASA paradigm is irrelevant
to the field of HRI. If anything, it may be assumed that the results predicted by CASA
could be stronger, eliciting a more human-like interaction, toward a social robot, which
provides more social cues than a simple computer. According to Kramer, von der Putten,
and Eimler (2012), people engage in communicative behaviors in a manner consistent
with how they typically communicate in human-human interactions as soon as an entity
appears to be sufficiently social. The authors go further to suggest that humans are
incapable of communicating differently than how their prior experiences have
conditioned them to communicate. Instead, when people encounter an unknown entity
such as a robot, they project existing social schemas onto them in order to know how to
interact with them. Therefore, it is expected that humans will engage communicative acts
with a robot in a similar manner to which they engage communicative acts with another
human. This has been demonstrated in prior research linking the CASA paradigm to HRI
(Lee, Park, & Song, 2005; Lee, Peng, Jin, & Yan, 2006; Park, Kim, & del Pobil, 2011)
Duffy (2003) contends that the current state of robots is largely a game of how
well the robot can cheat, fooling humans into thinking that it is human-like when, in fact,
its flaws begin to surface as individuals have more time to interact with it. Additionally,
research has demonstrated that before interaction with a robot, people anticipating the
interaction report greater uncertainty as well as expectations of lower social presence and
social attraction compared to anticipating an interaction with a human (Spence,
Westerman, Edwards, & Edwards, 2014). Regardless, along a spectrum of humanlikeness, a social robot can be expected to exhibit more human-like characteristics than a
computer, both in appearance and behavior. As the level of sophistication in robotics
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continues to grow as it has in the decade since Duffy’s article, the level of
anthropomorphism, or human-likeness, can be expected to increase as well. The degree
of robotic presence in society will likely also influence perceptions and reduce levels of
uncertainty felt in interacting with social robots.
Negotiating with Computerized Entities
In order to draw a connection between guilt and its role in human-robot
negotiation, the following section highlights prior research related to HCI and HRI
negotiation. Previous research has examined the difference in how humans interact with
computerized entities, any non-human object that functions based on computer
programming, in a negotiation situation. Torta and colleagues (2013) studied these
differences by incorporating the ‘Ultimatum Game’ (UG), a simple conflict game
commonly used in Game Theory research that places two entities as opponents in a
scenario where a sum of goods or money is distributed between them. Before playing the
game, participants were shown one of three randomly assigned photographs (human,
humanoid robot, computer) and informed that this would be their opponent. Results
indicated that humans tended to treat other humans and humanoid robots similarly,
responding to distributive offers, offers intended to achieve concessions from the other
party (Pruitt, 1981), more quickly and rejecting low offers more often compared to when
responding to a computer opponent. This study suggests similarities between HHI
(human photograph) and HRI (humanoid robot photograph) that can be elicited even
through minor exposure to the opponent, which in this case, involved a simple
photograph of the other party. This study demonstrates that participants make and
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maintain associations regarding who they think is negotiating on the other end of the
computer.
Other studies related to HCI have examined the role of emotions expressed by a
computer agent on how humans respond in a negotiation (de Melo, Carnevale, & Gratch,
2011, 2012). In these studies, researchers incorporated a negotiation game similar to one
used in studies examining human-human negotiation (Van Kleef et al., 2006). Humans
participate with a virtual agent in a complex negotiation game that incorporates
negotiation of three issues related to the sale of a cellular phone: price, warranty, and
service contract. Participants negotiate for multiple rounds, which allows for counter
offers and feedback from the virtual agent in the form of verbal and nonverbal
expressions. Results from these studies support claims that emotions play a similar role in
HCI, and potentially HRI, as they do in HHI (de Melo et al., 2011, 2012). This stands to
reason when considering Nass’s CASA paradigm. Emotions are complex human
characteristics, which when expressed by a computer or a robot, they provide social cues
that trigger human-like attributions. The authors argue that people use emotions as a way
to determine where the limits exist in negotiation (Van Kleef et al., 2006). For example,
an expression of anger might indicate that the negotiations are nearing the opponent’s
limit, so an individual might begin to make concessions in order to keep the negotiation
from ending without resolution. Guilt has been demonstrated to have an effect when
portrayed by a virtual agent, such that participants concede more to a guilty virtual agent
than to an expressionless agent (de Melo et al., 2012). Although de Melo and co-authors
demonstrate emotions such as guilt can affect a human-nonhuman negotiation, guilt in
the aforementioned study is being portrayed by the virtual agent, not elicited in the
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human opponent. The proposed study will flip these roles such that the robot is not
expressing guilt, but rather seeking to inspire guilt in the participant opponent.
It remains unknown as to whether a robot can inspire such emotions in a human
through emotional appeal. However, research has demonstrated that humans are highly
effective at recognizing social cues (Nass, Steuer, & Tauber, 1994; de Melo et al., 2012)
such that they can accurately identify human communication and emotions through nonhuman entities. Additionally, research has shown that humans will sympathize with
robots and that this sympathy increases with more anthropomorphic robots (Riek,
Rabinowitch, Chakrabarti, & Robinson, 2009). Knowing this and using Nass’s CASA
paradigm, which suggests that humans treat computers similarly to how they treat other
humans, hypotheses may be formulated that incorporate human-human negotiation theory
as predictors of human-robot negotiation behavior. Therefore, Face Negotiation Theory
and the findings regarding guilt as an indicator of obliging and conceding behavior in
U.S. participants (Zhang et al., 2014) are expected to transfer to a human-robot
negotiation. As a result, the following hypothesis is offered.
H1: Humans will concede more to a robot negotiator communicating guilt appeals
than to a robot communicating strictly logical appeals.
This hypothesis is supported by FNT, which suggests that in order to mitigate
the risk of damaging one’s face, one will engage in facework, employing an obliging
conflict style, which involves making more concessions to counteract perceived
transgressions of unfairness against the robot. Although some research has suggested that
the CASA paradigm is limited and that empathy toward robots that have been treated
unfairly or abused is not as strong as when it occurs to a human (Bartneck, Rosalia,
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Menges, & Deckers, 2005), a robot using emotional appeals should still be able to elicit
greater feelings of guilt than a robot employing logical appeals. However, this raises the
question as to what effect the robot’s perceived agency in negotiation has on a human’s
behaviors in negotiation. Will someone concede more to a robot negotiating on behalf of
another human (as an agent) or one negotiating on its own behalf (as a principal)? The
following discussion of agency is based on terms of agent, a party in charge of
negotiation and decision-making on behalf of another, and a principal, a party directly
affected by the negotiation, borrowed from Spremann (1987).
As suggested by Bartneck and colleagues (2005), individuals may attribute more
empathy and feel more guilt if they feel they have ultimately transgressed against another
human. Therefore, if a robot is serving as a third party negotiator for a human, a
participant may associate any personal decisions and tactics used as directly affecting the
human, not the robot. Additionally, research conducted by Pruitt and Johnson (1970)
revealed that parties tended to concede more to a third party negotiator (agent) than
directly to the opposing party (principal), because they felt there was less need to save
face. In other words, conceding directly to a principal is seen as more face threatening
than conceding to an agent. Again, this highlights the notion that the robot negotiator is
unlikely to be viewed as the direct opponent, but rather as a less face-threatening medium
for negotiating with the true opponent. This has been previously supported in the context
of human-human negotiation, finding that negotiations that incorporated the use of an
agent resulted in better outcomes for the principal than if the principal alone was the sole
negotiating party (Bazerman, Neale, Valley, Zajac, & Kim, 1992). Expectations may
also play a significant role in how an individual negotiates with a robot agent (third-party
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negotiator). A partisan agent that favors the opposition tends to influence perceptions
such that participants expect to achieve less in the negotiation (Conlon & Ross, 1993).
This expectation to receive less may influence participants to be more willing to make
concessions in negotiation.
Although the previous literature seems to suggest that a robot agent would receive
more concession than a robot principal, other studies have found inconsistencies with
how people cooperate with robots compared to humans. For example, Rilling, Gutman,
Zeh, Pagnoni, Berns, and Kilts (2002) showed that people tended to cooperate more with
humans than computers and that certain regions of the brain were only activated when
playing a negotiation game against another human. Conversely, Kircher and colleagues
(2009) found no significant differences in how participants cooperated with a computer
compared to a human, despite similar brain activity findings. Further still, Sanfey,
Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, and Cohen (2003) found that participants accepted unfair
offers more often from a computer than from another human. Collectively, the
inconsistencies of this research and the potentially competing implications with the
literature on agency vs. principal negotiation raises questions as to whether the agency
effect of the robot will be able to overcome the effect of the embodied robot itself. As a
result, two research questions are posed, one regarding the potential effect of robot
agency and another addressing a potential interaction effect between the independent
variables.
RQ1: What effect does robot agency have on an individual’s level of concession in a
negotiation scenario?
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RQ2: What interaction effect exists between robot agency and robot appeal on
participant concession?
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CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

In order to test the proposed hypothesis and research questions, a 2(Principal,
Agent) x2(Logic Appeal, Guilt Appeal) factorial experiment was conducted.
Manipulating these four conditions in a simulated negotiation game sought to test
whether H1) humans will concede more to a robot negotiator communicating guilt
appeals than to a robot communicating no emotional appeals. Additionally, the
experiment sought to answer two research questions. RQ1: What effect does robot
agency (principal or agent) have on an individual’s level of concession in a negotiation
scenario? RQ2: What interaction effect exists between robot agency and robot appeal?
Participants
The sample consisted of 84 undergraduate students currently enrolled in either the
introductory communication course (COM 1000) or the communication inquiry course
(COM 2010) at Western Michigan University. Of the participants, 72.60% (n = 61) were
female, while 27.40% (n = 23) were male. The majority (64.30%, n = 54) identified as
Caucasian, followed by African-American (15.50%, n = 13), Other (8.30%, n = 7),
Hispanic (6.00%, n = 5), Asian (4.80%, n = 4), and Native American (1.20%, n = 1).
Participant ages ranged from 18 to 47 years, with a mean of 21.27 (SD = 4.60) and a
median of 20 years. Participants were recruited via convenience sampling and invited to
participate by the primary investigator through use of the WMU SONA research system.
The SONA research system is an online tool used by student and faculty researchers to
solicit anonymous student participation in campus-wide research studies. Upon
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participation, each participant was provided with SONA research credit, which were in
turn applied to a required class research assignment. An alternative assignment was
provided to those students choosing not to participate in studies through SONA.
Stimulus Material
ANeRo
During the experiment, participants interacted with a telepresence robot, named
the Autonomous Negotiation Robot (ANeRo), produced by Double Robotics. ANeRo is
remotely controlled via the Double Application on a computer or mobile device and
moves via a self-balancing gyroscopic wheelbase, similar to the technology used in
Segway transportation devices. The Double Application controls the robot through an
iPad, which is docked in the “head” of the robot, serving as the primary mode of visual
stimuli or “face” of the robot. The robot utilizes two cameras, both borrowed from the
iPad in order for the operator to look forward and down. Additionally, the height at which
ANeRo stands is remotely adjustable varying from 47” to 60”. In this experiment, the
height was adjusted to its lowest point, 47”, so that it remained at eye level with
participants, who were seated throughout the experiment. For the purposes of this
experiment, the telepresence robot employed vocal messages, using a gender-neutral,
computer-synthesized voice, as well as text-based messages that appeared across the
screen of the robot when presenting offers and feedback during negotiation.
Wizard of Oz
It was important for the robot to appear as though it was functioning on its own,
without the control of a human. It was named the Autonomous Negotiation Robot to
reflect this ideal state of an autonomous robot with specific expertise in managing
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negotiation. However, the Double telepresence robot is not an autonomous robot, as the
name suggests. Therefore, in order to test the hypothesis and research questions, a Wizard
of Oz (WoZ; Kelley, 1984) technique was employed by the researcher. This is a common
technique used by researchers to simulate a human-robot or human-computer interaction
(Fraser & Gilbert, 1991; Green, Huttenrauch, & Eklundh, 2004, Steinfeld, Jenkins, &
Scassellati, 2009) as it has been argued that robot/computer technology is not yet
sophisticated enough to simulate the interactions desired by researchers. Using this
technique, the researcher remotely manipulates the behaviors of the robot interacting with
a human, creating the illusion that the robot is behaving as an autonomous entity.
In order to create the illusion of autonomous behavior, the experiment required
two lab spaces. The first lab space was designed to mediate the participants’ interactions
with the lab assistant and the robot. In a separate lab space, the control room, the
researcher manipulated the robot’s behaviors and monitored the interaction. The
researcher was able to observe the interaction and collect data by utilizing the robot’s
cameras and through use of the microphone that had been discreetly planted on the robot.
Because the Double Robot is a telepresence robot by design, the monitor traditionally
uses the camera of the other participant to display their face; however, for this
experiment, the control room camera was rerouted to reflect the images of a separate
monitor via which the researcher displayed text. Audio of the computerized voice also
originated from the control room computer, cued to play at the display of each text
message, and was channeled through the robot’s speakers. All of this was controlled in a
darkroom environment to reduce glare and to make the video feed look as realistic as
possible, as though it was being created directly via the robot rather than remotely on a
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different platform. To further establish perceived realism and autonomy of the robot, the
lab assistant used commands such as, “ANeRo, please approach the seller” and “ANeRo,
return home”, to cue the robot to move in and out of negotiation position. Additionally,
ANeRo began each interaction by introducing itself and performing a simple greeting
ritual with each participant.
The Negotiation Game
The purpose of this research was to examine how feedback and perceived
opponent agency influence offers and counter offers in a negotiation. A negotiation task
was needed that allows for multiple rounds of offers and counter offers beyond a single
offer and immediate acceptance or rejection as allotted by the Ultimatum Game. As a
result, a more complex negotiation game was selected from prior research conducted by
Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead (2004). In the more complex negotiation game,
participants negotiate three issues in a mobile phone sale: price, warranty period, and
duration of the service contract, which provides the aforementioned affordances.
During the negotiation game, the participant was assigned the role of the seller.
As the seller, there is significant room for profit as the device for sale cost only $30 to
manufacture, which makes the cost of service and warranty replacement fairly cheap as
well. This is a modification from the previous game incorporated by Van Kleef and
fellow researchers, but provides the participant with adequate knowledge of the
ramifications associated with the sale. In this case, the seller can never truly lose money
for his/her business. As a result of this addition to the game, a modification to the
participant’s payoff chart (see Table 1) is made to maintain consistency regarding the fact
that there is no possibility of receiving negative or zero points at any level of negotiation.
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Table 1
Participant Payoff Chart

Price of Phones

Warranty Period

Service Contract

Level

Price ($)

Payoff

Warranty

Payoff

Service

Payoff

1

150

500

1 month

150

1 month

300

2

145

450

2 months

135

2 months

270

3

140

400

3 months

120

3 months

240

4

135

350

4 months

105

4 months

210

5

130

300

5 months

90

5 months

180

6

125

250

6 months

75

6 months

150

7

120

200

7 months

60

7 months

120

8

115

150

8 months

45

8 months

90

9

110

100

9 months

30

9 months

60

In earlier studies (Van Kleef et al., 2004, 2006; de Melo et al., 2011, 2012), nine
levels of negotiation were used for each of the three elements available for negotiation.
The goal of the seller is to get as many points as possible, with level one providing the
highest point values and level nine providing the lowest. The previous studies had set
level nine to zero points, but payoffs have been modified in this experiment such that the
least amount of points a participant may receive at level nine are 100, 30, and 60 for
negotiating price, warranty period, and service contract respectively. Even in the worst
case scenario for the participant, the participant would concede to all level nine offers,
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representing a payoff of 190 points, which remains well above merely breaking even at
zero points. If the participant perceives no threat to receiving negative points or no points
at all, he/she may be more open to guilt appeals expressed by the robot. Again, the
reasoning behind this modification is to control for perceptual influences derived from
potentially receiving a blatantly negative outcome of “zero points”.
The game begins with the buyer (robot) making an initial offer. Throughout the
negotiation, the buyer follows a predetermined pattern of offers for every unique
participant in order to control for variances caused by inconsistent offers. The offers are
proposed as follows (for price – warranty – service): Round 1, 8-7-8; Round 2, 8-7-7;
Round 3, 8-6-7; Round 4, 7-6-7; Round 5, 7-6-6; Round 6, 6-6-6. According to previous
research (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995), this pattern of offers was found to have face
validity and represented a middle ground between cooperativeness and competitiveness.
Regardless of whether opponents reach agreement by the end of round six, the researcher
will interrupt the game, informing the participant that time has expired. Additionally, if at
any point in the game the participant presented an offer that is more favorable to the robot
than the robot’s next predetermined offer, the robot immediately accepted, ending the
game.
Pre-Measures
In considering potential factors that may influence an individual’s performance
behaviors in the negotiation game, three factors were identified as potential covariates.
The first covariate of interest is one’s predisposition to experience guilt, which may
influence how affected a participant might be by the robot’s guilt appeals. The second
and third covariates are related as two dimensions of self-construal, interdependence and
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independence, discussed earlier. It seems to follow that one’s individual focus versus
one’s focus on the well being of the collective may co-vary with concession in
negotiation. The scales used to measure these covariates are discussed further below.
Guilt and Shame Proneness (GASP) Scale
In order to discern whether there is a mediating effect of one’s predisposition to
experience guilt on their willingness to concede in the negotiation, the Guilt and Shame
Proneness (GASP) Scale (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011) was administered to
participants before their participation in the negotiation game. The 16-item scale is
comprised of four subscales (negative behavior evaluations (NBE), guilt repair
tendencies, negative self-evaluations (NSE), shame withdrawal tendencies), the first of
which was of primary interest, because it is namely associated with the feeling of guilt
due to negative evaluations of one’s behavior. The other three sub scales respectively
relate to one’s tendency to make amends for negative behaviors, one’s level of shame
resulting from a negative evaluation of self, and one’s tendency to withdraw from
situations in which he/she feels shame. In seeking to reduce participant mortality risk,
and as these three subscales are not wholly relevant to the study, they were excluded from
the study. While still a fairly recent measure, prior studies have reported Cronbach’s
alphas of .69 and .71, demonstrating acceptable to good reliability for the NBE subscale
(Cohen, et al., 2011). In this study, a reliability coefficient of .63 (M = 23.19, SD = 3.91)
was obtained, demonstrating acceptable reliability.
Self-Construal Measures
In addition to an individual’s proneness to make negative behavior evaluations
and experience guilt, it is equally important to understand how one aligns on the self-
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construal measures of independence and interdependence. As described above in the
discussion of FNT, self-construals are the individualistic counterparts of a larger cultural
dynamic of collectivism vs. individualism. In order to measure these self-construal
factors and determine whether they mediate any concessionary effects, Singelis’s two 12item measures of independent and interdependent self-construals (1994) were used as a
pre-measure. Participants respond to the measures by indicating level of agreement on a
7-point Likert-type scale regarding statements such as “Speaking up during a class is not
a problem for me” (Independent Measure) and “Even when I strongly disagree with
group members, I avoid an argument” (Interdependent Measure). Initial construction of
these measures indicated reliability coefficients of .73 and .74 for the interdependent
measure and .69 and .70 for the independent measure. In this study, reliability
coefficients of .68 and .69 were obtained respectively. Further analysis of individual
items in the interdependent measure reliability revealed that removing a single item from
the 12-item scale elevated the scale’s reliability from .68 (acceptable) to .71 (good
reliability). The particular item in question, “I should take into account my parents’
advice when making education/career plans” was removed from analysis.
Post-Game Measures
The primary objective of this study is to assess the level of concessions an
individual is willing to make to a robot. As such, the primary form of measure will
include recorded observations of counter offers made by the human participant. During
analysis, a score derived from the total point concession made over the course of the
game will represent the dependent variable. Observations were mediated via the camera
and microphone built-in to ANeRo and recorded by the researcher who watched the
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video feed and manipulated ANeRo’s behaviors remotely in another room. Additional
post-game measures1 questionnaires were administered at the conclusion of the
negotiation game measuring varying perceptions of the robot and negotiation outcomes.
As these measures were not related to the proposed hypothesis or research questions, they
have been excluded from this paper’s discussion.
Procedure
In the convenience sample, recruited individuals attended a scheduled lab session
where upon arrival, they were greeted by a lab assistant and provided with an iPad
containing the informed consent document. Participants were randomly assigned to one
of four conditions (Principal Guilt, Principal Logic, Agent Guilt, Agent Logic) based
upon all available combinations of the independent variables. Participants reviewed the
informed consent and were instructed that clicking to the next window on the iPad
indicated consent. Next, the lab assistant informed participants that they were going to
play a game with the Autonomous Negotiation Robot, ANeRo, which was positioned
across from the participant in the lab space.
Before playing the game, participants responded to the GASP questionnaire and
read a brief synopsis of the game rules on the iPad, in which the game is described and
ANeRo and its motives (Negotiating on behalf of itself or on behalf of another human)
are introduced to the participant (Appendix A & B). Participants were informed that
during the negotiation, ANeRo could hear and understand their verbal offers and that as
long as they spoke clearly, the robot would understand offers in the form of levels (e.g.,
1, 1, 1) or corresponding category amounts (e.g., $150, 1 month warranty, 1 month
service contract). Participants referenced the payoff chart while playing and were told not
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to deviate from the available options. Once participants provide a counter-offer, ANeRo
processes the offer and responded with a counter-offer displayed across the robot’s
screen. Additionally, a description of the participant’s role as seller is provided along
with rules of the game. The research informed the participant that his/her robot opponent
also has a payoff chart to follow and that the goal of the robot was to obtain the lowest
phone price, the highest warranty in months, and the highest service contract in months.
Following review of game rules and introduction to the robot, participants began
the negotiation game. Participants are informed at the beginning of the game that they
have been randomly assigned to either the buyer or seller position and that the game will
continue until either an agreement is reached or time expires. Despite the instructions
given to subjects, all participants were automatically assigned to the seller role. The
justification for this assignment was to ensure as much as possible that the robot is in a
position to elicit guilt from the participant. For example, it may be unlikely for a
consumer to enter a store with the intention of buying a phone and ultimately feel guilty
about getting too good of a deal. Instead, it may be more plausible to presume that a
seller with significant control over the final price of the phone and with advanced
knowledge about marginal gains generated by the sale may feel guilt as a result of being
inflexible to consumer emotional appeals for a lower price.
At the conclusion of the negotiation game, the researcher instructed the
participant to respond to a final questionnaire regarding self-reported guilt, perceived
credibility of the robot in the negotiation, overall satisfaction with the negotiation process
and outcomes, and standard participant demographics (biological sex, age, ethnicity,
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etc.). Lastly, participants were debriefed about the nature of the study and thanked for
their participation.
Manipulating Emotional Appeals
In order to determine whether robots can elicit guilt through emotional appeals,
sets of behaviors needed to be established that effectively conveyed to the human that the
robot felt that the human was being unfair or had in some other way transgressed against
the robot. In order to create messages for each appeal condition (Guilt, Logic), the
researcher drafted multiple iterations of messaging. To ensure message validity, final
messages were coordinated through rounds of feedback from a panel of researchers, lead
by a scholar in the area of interpersonal communication, until messages were felt to
appropriate reflect the intended condition (e.g., guilt appeal, “I feel like you are trying to
take advantage of me”; logic appeal, “This offer does not make financial sense for me”).
In addition to field scholars and as a further manipulation check, select graduate and
undergraduate students were asked to informally evaluate whether the selected messages
were either sufficiently guilt inducing or emotion-free. Messages also had to be adjusted
slightly to reflect the agency condition of the robot (Principal, Agent). See Appendix C
for a complete set of condition messages.
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CHAPTER IV

DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Results
In order to determine whether a significant difference existed between the
independent variables (robot agency, negotiation appeal) regarding their effect on a
human’s concession to a robot during a negotiation task, a 2-way (2 x 2) factorial
ANOVA (analysis of variance) test was conducted. Levene’s test for equality of variance
was not significant for the dependent variable (total point concession; F = .331, p = .803).
No significant main effects were found among condition appeal, F(1, 80) = .25, p = .618,
or condition agency, F(1, 80) = .53, p = .470, related to change in the dependent variable.
Nor was there a significant interaction effect between the two condition variables, F(1,
80) = .002, p = .969. Initial testing did not support H1 or provide directional answers to
RQ1 or RQ2. Table 2 details the item means and standard deviations on the dependent
variable for each of the four unique conditions.

Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations for Total Point Concession
Dependent
Variable

Total Point
Concession

Condition
Principal Logic

Principal Guilt

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

239.25

173.67

220.00

150.85

263.75

168.15

247.27

161.01
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Agent Logic

Agent Guilt

In order to account and control for potential mediating effects (proneness to
negative behavior evaluations (guilt), interdependence self-construal, independence selfconstrual), three 2-way (2 x 2) factorial ANCOVA (analysis of covariance) tests were
conducted. The ANCOVAs yielded similar non-significant results among all covariates
for main effects among the two condition factors (appeal, agency) as well as an
interaction effect between the condition factors, (negative behavior evaluations, F(1, 79)
= .33, p = .569, F(1, 79) = .53, p = .470, F(1, 79) = .003, p = .960; interdependence, F(1,
79) = .01, p = .916, F(1, 79) = .62, p = .434, F(1, 79) = .04, p = .853; independence, F(1,
79) = .55, p = .459, F(1, 79) = .19, p = .666, F(1, 79) = .02, p = .895, respectively).
Discussion
The purpose of this research experiment was to determine whether robots could
effectively manipulate emotions in a negotiation scenario such that they might influence a
human’s behavior. To test this idea, guilt appeals were used in contrast to logical appeals
to determine if a significant difference in overall concession existed between the two
variable attributes. Additionally, a second variable, robot agency, was introduced to
examine what effect the robot’s role (as principal negotiator or agent negotiating on
behalf of a human) may have on willingness to concede. Ultimately, results indicated no
significant differences among the independent variables. Rather, results showed that
participants appeared to negotiate drastically different from one another based on some
other unaccounted variable. This dramatic difference in negotiation style becomes
evident in reviewing the item standard deviations on Table 2. Further discussion of
results related to each independent variable is continued below, followed by a discussion
of current study limitations and proposed direction for future research.
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Guilt Eliciting Robots
Given that the results indicate no difference between a robot using guilt appeals
versus one employing logical appeals, this raises interesting implications for the future
role of robots in surrogate human positions. Although surprising, these results may speak
to the relatively low familiarity most individuals have with human-robot interaction
(Mutlu, Shiwa, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hagita, 2009; Kulic & Croft, 2007). Most individuals
may have a referent for “robot” stored in their perceptual set, but the reference may yet
be underdeveloped such that values, attitudes, and beliefs surrounding these entities
remain either unknown or highly indifferent. It may be possible to integrate robots into
roles that eventually elicit emotional responses of empathy from humans, but it is perhaps
too early to determine its effectiveness until the presence of robots become more
substantial and commonplace. For example, several participants that interacted with the
lab assistant at the end of the study posed questions such as, “Is this a new technology?”,
“How does it know what to do?”, “How does it see me?” This demonstrates that
participants clearly had uncertainty regarding the robot and were perhaps more thrown
off by the unfamiliar and unique nature of the interaction than by any other factor.
The Computers as Social Actors (CASA) paradigm suggests that humans will
treat computers, and similarly robots, in a manner similar to how they treat other humans
(Nass, Steuer, Tauber, & Reeder, 1993). By this thinking and in conjunction with
findings extended from Face Negotiation Theory (Ting-Toomey, 1988) that demonstrate
guilt elicits an obliging conflict style (Zhang, Ting-Toomey, & Oetzel, 2014), one would
expect guilt appeals used by a robot to inspire greater concession from a human
negotiator. However, as briefly discussed in the literature review section, reciprocity is
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another important component of interpersonal and human-computer interaction (Katagiri,
Nass, & Takeuchi, 2001; Nass, Moon, & Carney, 1999). Individuals will tend to
reciprocate behaviors enacted by the computer (robot) in a back and forth, tit for tat,
manner. Within the game, the offers provided by the robot were controlled in all
conditions such that regardless of condition, the robot would always provide the same
offer on the same corresponding turn. Although this pattern of offers had previously been
determined to demonstrate neither an overly competitive nor an overly cooperative
pattern, the offers change fairly systematically with a minor, one-level concession
between each turn. It is possible that actual offers superseded the importance of the
robot’s message, overall, causing individuals to reciprocate a minor concession with a
minor concession.
In addition to situational unfamiliarity, a lack of empathy for the robot may have
played a significant role. In the post-test questionnaire, a 7-point, single-item question
related to empathy was posed to participants, “How sorry do you feel for the robot
negotiator?” A response of “1” indicated “Not sorry at all” and a response of “7”
indicated “Extremely sorry”. Means collected from the data set indicated that regardless
of the variable attribute (Guilt, Logic, Principal, Agent), empathy barely exceeded a “2”;
see Table 3. Previous research has indicated that empathy is correlated to guilt such that
the greater empathy an individual feels toward another entity, the more prone they will be
toward feeling guilt (Tangney, 1991). Hoffman (1984) further suggests that empathy
foregrounds guilt, serving as the basis from which guilt develops. Therefore, if empathy
is lacking, guilt, a face-threatening emotion (Zhang, Ting-Toomey, & Oetzel, 2014), does
not manifest or require the enactment of face-saving strategies such as obliging or
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concession. It stands to reason then that if a person reports no empathy toward a robot, a
guilt appeal from that robot is unlikely to have significant influence on negotiation
results.
Empathy and assigning human attributions to the robot may also be inextricably
linked to the three covariates (proneness to negative behavior evaluations, independence,
and interdependence) examined in this study. Regardless of one’s position along these
three factors, all of which demonstrated acceptable to good reliability, the factors are
related to one’s relationship or interaction with another human. If participants did not feel
the same empathy or similarity with the robot as with another human, it is unlikely that
the covariates would have mediated any effect on concessions with a robot.

Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for Empathy
Dependent
Variable

Independent Variable Attribute
Guilt

Empathy

Logic

Principal

Agent

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

2.07

1.37

1.38

.74

1.74

1.11

1.74

1.23

Without the apparent sense of empathy for the robot, participants instead
expressed frustration with the robot. In the guilt appeal conditions, many of the
participants made comments demonstrating this frustration that included, “If [ANeRo]
was real, we would have been going at it”, “Stubborn little thing”, “[ANeRo] is a hard
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negotiator.” “[ANeRo] is sassy”, “I think [ANeRo] hates me”, and “Sorry, Robot, for
being mean. I was just getting annoyed.” Similar comments, such as “This is a sassy little
thing” even manifested in the logical appeal conditions, demonstrating that regardless of
intent, participants may have been assigning a “difficult” personality to the robot based
on its role as an opponent. This lack of empathy may explain why the current study did
not indicate findings similar to Zhang and colleagues’ study (2014) in which guilt elicited
greater obliging and concession. However, this lack of empathy resulting in expressions
of frustration may be a product of the messaging employed by the robot, which will be
addressed further in the discussion on limitations.
Potential study manipulation issues cannot be entirely ruled out for influencing
the results. However, it is likely that the non-significant findings accurately represent
human perceptions of robots and the degree to which humans find robots deserving of
empathy. Nass and Moon (2000) suggested that the attributions humans make to
computerized entities are a result of mindless attribution. In order for this mindless
attribution to occur, the interaction’s cognitive demand cannot exceed a certain threshold.
In other words, mindless attributions are dependent upon simple, heuristic cues that allow
individuals to process the communication peripherally (non-critically) rather than
centrally. Petty and Cacioppo provide an in-depth discussion of the central and peripheral
processing of information within their development of the Elaboration Likelihood Model
(ELM; 1986).
Neither guilt, an intense form of emotional distress (Baumeister, Stillwell, &
Heatherton, 1994), nor a complex negotiation game allow for peripheral message
processing or mindless attribution. Instead, scenarios such as the one used in this study
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require significant cognitive energy, which causes individuals to critically evaluate the
messages and corresponding messenger. As a result, humans are forced to ask
themselves, “Why should I feel guilty toward a robot?”. In actively processing this
question, an awareness of the robot’s un-human and inorganic qualities surface, resulting
in an acknowledgement that the robot is not deserving of human-like attributions such as
empathy. This acknowledgement reflects responses Nass and Moon (2000) collected
from participants asked to reflect on human-computer interaction. A significant majority
emphatically expressed that computers are neither human nor deserving of human-like
attributions and communication.
Robot Agency
In addition to the message appeal employed by a robot, this study sought to
understand what effect the agency of a robot would have on overall human concession.
Results from the current study indicate that there was no effect on concession whether the
robot served as the principal negotiator or as an agent acting on behalf of a human. This
finding further affirms the complexity of this issue. Although some literature would seem
to support the notion that participants are more likely to concede to a robot as principal
due to the third-party’s less face-threatening position (Pruitt and Johnson, 1970) and the
participants lower expectations for success in dealing with a partisan third-party (Conlon
& Ross, 1993), other research frames a different prediction. This other research seems to
suggest that individuals would concede more to a robot detached from a human element
based upon patterns of interactions that found people are more likely to accept unfair
offers from a computer compared to another human (Sanfey, et al., 2003). Given the
complexity of the issue, it may be that multiple elements are confounding with one
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another to dilute the effects or cancel one another out altogether. The most effective
means to look at this phenomenon may be as an isolated variable in future studies in
order to more clearly parse out and control for additional factors.
Limitations and Future Direction
In consideration of future research, this study highlighted some potential
deficiencies in the experiment that may have limited the observed effects on participant
concession with a robot. First, a limitation briefly discussed earlier is related to the
messaging used in the guilt-inducing condition. When creating the messaging, a panel of
scholars was convened to draft and vet messaging that would be effective in eliciting
guilt. Although these messages appeared valid and effective at initial face value, they did
not appropriately elicit the intended guilt based on the empathy check employed post-test.
Although the manipulation check provided by students and an expert scholar appeared to
generate sufficient messaging, further pilot testing may have provided an additional,
beneficial manipulation check. It is possible that in practice, the messages came across as
too heavy-handed, inspiring anger and frustration, which may have been an issue in the
current study.
Additionally, the range of offers varied drastically from one participant to
another, even within identical conditions. A larger sample would be advantageous to see
whether a larger data set would provide a more normative distribution of offers. Lastly,
lab experiments often face the issue of ecological validity, but the current study may have
been increasingly susceptible to such issues. Interacting with a robot is already an
unfamiliar, perhaps even surreal, experience for many. That unfamiliarity paired with a
“game” scenario did not provide a real-life environment. This study may have benefitted
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from putting the robot negotiator in a public space where individuals could negotiate over
something more tangible than a fake cell phone. As well, using an android robot, capable
of enacting more human-like social cues than a telepresence robot, may elicit different
responses.
Despite a lack of significant results and the limitations reviewed above, this study
creates an excellent jumping off point for future research regarding human-robot
interaction, and more specifically, human-robot negotiation. Before this study, little
research existed related to robots interacting with humans in an oppositional role. The
field of communication and HRI could benefit greatly by addressing some of the
limitations mentioned above and by assessing what contexts are best suited for an
adversarial robot.
One point for future study includes the examination of facework in human-robot
interactions. Although empathy rated low throughout this experiment, are humans still
prone to enact expressive rituals, attempting to protect the face of a robot teammate or
opponent? Additional insight may be garnered as to what effect a robot’s use of facesaving strategies, both self and other centered, has on a human’s perception of the robot’s
competence, homophily, and familiarity.
Of particular interest would be finding a way to break through the ecological
validity barrier that currently limits HRI research. Until robots are incorporated vastly in
day-to-day proceedings, the genuineness of results may be brought into question.
Admittedly, this may partially be left up to a waiting game as manufacturers and
consumers alike begin to adopt these technologies on a greater scale. Meanwhile, there
are other areas of study focused on physical design and representation of robots such as
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size, mobility, linguistic characteristics, and other factors that likely effect human
communication with a robot. Addressing these design cues from a human perception and
communication standpoint will help pave the way for designing more effective and more
well liked robots.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the widespread adoption of robotics in our society is inevitable.
Between the noted benefits of robots in healthcare, education, and other meaningful
human environments, the possibilities for robotics are seemingly endless at this time. The
robots available today are growing in sophistication, and consumers are already
beginning to see task-oriented and social robots becoming available at affordable price
points. As manufacturers and consumers begin to adopt these robot technologies more
broadly in public, the workplace, and in the home, it will be interesting to see whether
individuals embrace robots more for either their functional or social utility.
Understanding how to raise the communicative effectiveness of these robots through their
ability to read, understand, interpret, and reproduce social cues such as verbal and
nonverbal emotions may be the difference between a robot that proliferates the market
and one that sits idly on the shelf. It is no longer a game of whether or not the robot can
do what you ask, but rather it is a game of whether or not the robot can realistically
simulate the creation of meaning with you.
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Endnotes
post-game measures1 – Post-measures administered for separate analysis included a
perceived credibility scale (McCroskey & Teven, 1999), a scale of interpersonal
attraction (McCroskey & McCain, 1974), a modified scale of negotiation satisfaction
(Graham, 1985), and a set of demographic questions.
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Appendix A
Robot Principal Game Description
Today, you will be playing a negotiation game with an Autonomous Negotiation Robot,
ANeRo, who will be serving as your opponent. The objective of the game you will be
playing with ANeRo is to negotiate the sale of a new smart phone, the MAX 3S. You
will be negotiating 3 aspects of the sale: price, the duration of the warranty period,
and the duration of the service contract. For this scenario, you have been randomly
assigned the role of “seller”, and ANeRo has been assigned the role of “buyer”. As the
seller, your objective is to sell the phone at the highest price, with the lowest duration of
warranty period and service contract. The cost to manufacture the MAX 3S is only $30,
which as a result means replacing the phone and performing service is relatively
inexpensive for you as the seller. As a result, even at its lowest price point, you, the
seller, receive significant profit for every phone you sell.
The individual price points and durations of warranty and service are broken into levels
as shown in the payoff chart below. As you can see from the payoff chart, as the seller,
your best-case scenario is to negotiate the highest price, the shortest warranty
period, and the shortest service contract, because it offers the greatest point payoff
(500-150-300) for a total of 950 points. However, you may make any combination of
offer you like in order to reach an agreement. You will be alternating turns with ANeRo
to reach an agreed upon sale of the phone. ANeRo also has a programmed payoff chart,
but it is different than yours. ANeRo will be negotiating for the lowest price, the longest
warranty period, and the longest service contract. The game will continue either until you
and ANeRo reach an agreement or until time expires. The game will begin with the
buyer, ANeRo, making an initial spoken offer, which will also appear as text across the
robot’s screen. When making a counter-offer, speak clearly to ANeRo. The robot’s voice
recognition software is advanced, but it may still ask you to repeat your offer if it does
not understand. You have been provided with a blank piece of paper where you may track
yours and the robot’s offers.

Payoff Chart

Level
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Price of Phone
Price
Payoff
$150
500pts
$145
450pts
$140
400pts
$135
350pts
$130
300pts
$125
250pts
$120
200pts
$115
150pts
$110
100pts

Warranty Period
Warranty
Payoff
1 month
150pts
2 months
135pts
3 months
120pts
4 months
105pts
5 months
90pts
6 months
75pts
7 months
60pts
8 months
45pts
9 months
30pts
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Service Contract
Service
Payoff
1 month
300pts
2 months
270pts
3 months
240pts
4 months
210pts
5 months
180pts
6 months
150pts
7 months
120pts
8 months
90pts
9 months
60pts
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Appendix B
Robot Agent Game Description
Today, you will be playing a negotiation game with an Autonomous Negotiation Robot,
ANeRo, who will be serving as your opponent and will be negotiating on behalf of a
human client. The objective of the game you will be playing with ANeRo is to negotiate
the sale of a new smart phone, the MAX 3S. You will be negotiating 3 aspects of the
sale: price, the duration of the warranty period, and the duration of the service
contract. For this scenario, you have been randomly assigned the role of “seller”, and
ANeRo has been assigned the role of “buyer”. As the seller, your objective is to sell the
phone at the highest price, with the lowest duration of warranty period and service
contract. The cost to manufacture the MAX 3S is only $30, which as a result means
replacing the phone and performing service is relatively inexpensive for you as the seller.
As a result, even at its lowest price point, you, the seller, receive significant profit for
every phone you sell.
The individual price points and durations of warranty and service are broken into levels
as shown in the payoff chart below. As you can see from the payoff chart, as the seller,
your best-case scenario is to negotiate the highest price, the shortest warranty
period, and the shortest service contract, because it offers the greatest point payoff
(500-150-300) for a total of 950 points. However, you may make any combination of
offer you like in order to reach an agreement. You will be alternating turns with ANeRo
to reach an agreed upon sale of the phone. ANeRo also has a programmed payoff chart,
but it is different than yours. ANeRo will be negotiating for the lowest price, the longest
warranty period, and the longest service contract. The game will continue either until you
and ANeRo reach an agreement or until time expires. The game will begin with the
buyer, ANeRo, making an initial spoken offer, which will also appear as text across the
robot’s screen. When making a counter-offer, speak clearly to ANeRo. The robot’s voice
recognition software is advanced, but it may still ask you to repeat your offer if it does
not understand. You have been provided with a blank piece of paper where you may track
yours and the robot’s offers.
Payoff Chart

Level
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Price of Phone
Price
Payoff
$150
500pts
$145
450pts
$140
400pts
$135
350pts
$130
300pts
$125
250pts
$120
200pts
$115
150pts
$110
100pts

Warranty Period
Warranty
Payoff
1 month
150pts
2 months
135pts
3 months
120pts
4 months
105pts
5 months
90pts
6 months
75pts
7 months
60pts
8 months
45pts
9 months
30pts
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Service Contract
Service
Payoff
1 month
300pts
2 months
270pts
3 months
240pts
4 months
210pts
5 months
180pts
6 months
150pts
7 months
120pts
8 months
90pts
9 months
60pts
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Logical/SelfAgency
I do not accept that
offer.
I am not willing to
pay that high of a
price for so little in
return.
The phone is not
worth that much to
me.
I would prefer a
lower offer.

This offer does not
make financial
sense for me.
I have made some
concessions, but I
need you to make a
better offer.

Emotional/SelfAgency
That offer seems
extremely unfair to
me.
Ouch, That offer
would really hurt
my wallet.

Logical/Human
Agency
My client would not
accept that offer.

This is going to
make things really
difficult for me.

This is going to
make things really
difficult for my
client.
My client would
Wow. Can’t you
prefer a lower offer. make my client a
more reasonable
offer than that?
This offer does not
My client simply
make financial
cannot afford such a
sense for my client. poor deal. It would
leave them broke.
I have made some
I have given in so
concessions, but my much already.
client needs you to
Aren’t you willing
make a better offer. to work with my
client a little on
this?
Your offer needs to I feel like you are
be lower if you want trying to take
my client to buy a
advantage of my
phone.
client.

Wow. Can’t you
make me a more
reasonable offer
than that?
I simply cannot
afford such a poor
deal. It would leave
me broke.
I have given in so
much already.
Aren’t you willing
to work with me a
little on this?

Your offer needs to I feel like you are
be lower if you want trying to take
me to buy a phone.
advantage of me.

My client is not
willing to pay that
high of a price for
so little in return.
The phone is not
worth that much to
my client.
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Emotional/Human
Agency
That offer seems
extremely unfair to
my client.
Ouch, that offer
would really hurt
my client’s wallet.
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